ponedeljek, 18. marec 2013

TALKS, PAMPHLETS (COMMENTARIES, REFLECTIONS…)


TALKS, PAMPHLETS (COMMENTARIES, REFLECTIONS…)
Jože Barši


1

Talk on the rounds1 of the Academy2: spring semester, May 2010

I seriously doubt the possibility of any major changes occurring at the level of the institution. I see the institution as a more or less unfavorable framework for the concrete actions of individuals. And such actions are the responsibility of either the students or the teachers. After all, they are the people that, apart from the administration and other non-faculty staff, constitute the academy. This is why I find all the seemingly minor differences so important – the otherness that occurs within formalized procedures as well as outside them.

A thing that seems particularly important is “connecting” these differences. In the beginning, there is similarity, which is helpful; in the stages that follow, however, there is the coexistence of conflicting positions which, in their non-unifying function, lead to rethinking. Let me stress: the idea is not, and should never be, to impose one approach, one formalization, one visualization. In the end it always turns out that the coexistence of differences makes otherness possible. Or in other words: it is important to take a militant stand on one’s beliefs without losing sight of the fact that we are safe only when thinking about and standing up for the safety of the one taking the opposite position. This does not mean relativizing everything or, as I said, imposing a single approach. Far from it – it means, above all, an even stronger conceptualization of diverse territories.

What is the thing I call militancy of thought, what is it that I am after? The coexistence of thought, of course. Coexistence with what? The point here is that thought is material, as material as any other material encountered at our institution. We could say: an idea is not a concept but an operation, an act that works in the material world, and as such, an act of radical desublimation – not of exaltation, not of transfixion, but of affirmation. Or more precisely, it is the emptiness/nothing/nonsense/ problem that subsequently affirms the possibility of emancipation.

To sum up the words of Rado Riha: “An idea is an object of a special kind, and as such non-designed, it is a token of the object’s artificiality and its ontological insecurity, which is a mark of still-openness.

This is not about Kant’s idea of transforming the world in the manner of the relation theory—practice or contemplation—operation. Far from it. It is about thought being an object among other objects, not theory that affects practice as a consequence, but an object sharing the fate of all other objects in the world.

The question is thus not ‘What is an idea?’ but ‘What does an idea do in the world?’. Thought is ‘after something’. Of course, it’s not after forceful realization – beware of your wishes coming true; what is important is that thought establishes a distance to itself. That it wants something, that it ‘is after’ something, but that it adds another thought act to this ‘wanting’. There is a thing that makes one think, there is a source of thought, of thought about something, and as such the thought is independent of its source, it thinks the thought itself. It is a presupposition of pure thought which in operation produces its materiality, and as such works in the real world, and in its working produces the interference that is not evolutionary.”3 An example of this thing, or if you will, of good work functioning in the world, is that it makes or forces us to think.


2

Talk on the rounds of the Academy: fall semester, January 2011

Last year I spoke about the thought that, in the act of thinking, produces its materiality; this semester was dedicated to the problem of the representation of this thought. To put it differently: the discussions were about the relation formal—informal. Our point of departure was Charles Harrison’s texts.

Sculpture retrograding to the traditional model is a matter of ignorance and economy. A thing that causes concern is that practice – any artistic practice – does not have the power to resist having its fate dictated by sponsors, no matter how insignificant. If art possessed real social and economic power, we wouldn’t even think about reverting to traditional models. The obvious regression of, say, public sculpture in Slovenia would not, in all likelihood, even be possible in this form. Of course, the problem – or part of the problem – is our saying nothing. This is also the topic of our discussions this year: how historically achieved developments in modernism have again, obviously, been lost4, forgotten; developments that, in my view at least, form the basis of contemporary art practices. Of course, I am not referring to early or high modernism, but to the efforts that those who opposed Greenberg and Fried invested in minimalist and post-minimalist practices. We covered the lessons dealing with the late 1960s, trying to bring the antiformalist approaches of the time into relation with present-day developments. Of course, the point is not to uncritically accept or glorify or mystify practices concurrent with high modernism, but to reflect on them, comment on them, critically address them. To research, review, and discuss them with the aim of stimulating reflection on contemporary artistic practices.

The point is also not the autonomy of art or fetishizing it; as soon as art turns into a commodity, it becomes dogmatic and decadent. Autonomy in artistic practices must always be relative; that is, open to criticism, to the “reality” of its environment, and to the changes that new circumstances bring. Furthermore, the relativeness of this autonomy must be checked and rechecked, put into the context of a world of changing circumstances, that is to say, the history we live and create. Because, if we were to allow the autonomy of art to become fixed, that would entail also accepting some conventions and protocols of what artistic practices should be like. Now, obviously, this is something that cannot be completely avoided at a school like ours, but what I would like to stress is this reverse side of art, which speaks of that which is (as yet) not art, not part of the professional field or part of what experts/connoisseurs recognize as art(works).



3

Talk at the opening of the Utopian Seminar exhibition at the Museum of Architecture and Design: spring semester, June 2011

Speeches at exhibition openings are expected to be short, just a few words about the works and a thanks to all the people involved. Nevertheless, I’d like to take this opportunity and actually say something. My “say” will refer to a whole year’s worth of work and reflections that we – teachers and students – have fairly successfully shared.

I won’t talk about individual works; after all, these are still student works, done, in terms of time and space, at the Academy of Fine Arts and Design in Ljubljana. I find it important to talk about how the year-long project evolved and what it triggered. What effect it had, and how this in turn affected the agents of the community, or better, the agents of the Utopians collective. Unlike historical utopias, our project was not the result of the thoughts of one person and his or her dissatisfaction with the state of society. Our experiment was particularly demanding in that it involved a great number of people, students and faculty. The procedures, protocols, methods, and practices of teaching changed to the extent we accepted the idea of equality of intelligences. What this means is simply that we do not enter the familiar positions of knowing, but depart from the fact that we are equal in our capacities for learning and that we do not enter the process as a tabula rasa, but bring the whole range of our previous knowledge, learning, and opinions to it.

If a community is a group of different people recognized as equal, a collective must be goal-oriented to be efficient in its work; think, for instance, of a business venture. The paradox inherent in this relationship is apparent already in the definitions: a community as a group of individuals and a collective as a venture of orientation that enables efficiency. This relation must exist not only between individuals, but also between individual professional fields. Our project involved the participation of students of visual communication, industrial design, sculpture, painting, and their professors. Collectives came together, disintegrated, fell apart, got along, did not get along, and reassembled. Regardless of all the drama and the passivity involved, I find this mixing, transferring and also quitting crucial. This effort invested in being together, despite the different positions of departure in terms of profession, personality, and opinion, is crucial. Being part of a community is easy – as long as one abides by the rules of the game. The problem arises when a community must act as a collective working toward a common goal. This makes the game more complicated. The militancy of individuality, one’s thought or idea must be defended, but in a way that preserves the dignity of the thought of another, which necessarily entails defetishizing one’s own professional field and in no way disparaging any professional point of view. Our aim was not to arrive at a consensus on what art and design are, or a consensus about a correct formalization of contents. A creative collective is not consensual; it is a space that ensures and enables constructive disagreements, differences, and divergences between practices. It is a coexistence of conflicting positions, which does not entail relativizing everything; on the contrary, through disagreement individual positions are reactivated, mobilized, made topical, and reconsidered. This means that individual practices are not reconciled, there is no conclusion, but a dynamic relation that reconfigures the sensuous experience over and over. At the same time defetishizing individual practices enables new formal freedom.

The procedures of formalizing are not stipulated, but open in the process of the operativeness of a (still) working idea; in this they differ from, for instance, fixed concepts or familiar definitions. This is where the collective is so important, even if it consists of only one school, one institution, one task group, or as few as just two people. Education or learning is not just accumulation of empirical knowledge in solitude, between a book and a student, far from that: learning is the mixing of bodies that enables encounters, and as a consequence, also discord, conflicts that can turn out to be essential for dismantling old views and introducing new ones. A school is a space of possible interactions between a teacher and students, a teacher and a single student, or students amongst themselves. The latter is particularly important in an art school. To observe what the others are doing, compare it with one’s own work, or confront those surrounding one with commentaries, questions, skepticism, or justifications; to embrace such encounters with an open mind. On this subject Deleuze offers that thinking is an encounter and it is this encounter that is making us think.5 An encounter is always an encounter with something unrecognizable that arouses interest – that curiosity innate to many animals and to children, though subsequently often suppressed in the dogmatic thought processes enforced by institutions.


4

Talk on the rounds of the ALUO: fall semester, Affirmation and Sense, January 2012

As I have often said in the past, making the transition from tasks assigned by a professor or the study program to more independent work that is to culminate in a diploma work is extremely difficult for students. This year I have decided to take a different approach. I have spent far less time dealing directly with specific student works and focused more on teaching from the sidelines as it were. Two notions took center stage: affirmation and sense. I spoke about them at Friday lectures throughout the semester.

Starting something that will eventually evolve into one’s artistic practice means starting to “think for oneself”. Learning in this case is not just empirical mediation between ignorance and knowledge, but much more than that. One’s entire body is involved in the learning processes, the whole scope of sensation and thinking. We could put it this way: knowledge is not accumulated dogmatic principles of knowing; rather, learning is thinking beyond thinking. Here “beyond” means the space beyond empirical knowledge, beyond the familiar and prescribed representation.

This “beyond” is not the realm of some childish imagination. I understand imagination in terms of the effort to arrive at thought, to arrive at something that matters to us and that for this reason makes sense to us. Of course, it is necessary to be aware of the conditions of defining sense that only originates in an environment free of sense and therefore floating in the indefiniteness of senselessness. Sense is an event that happens or does not happen; it is not fixed, but rather a dimension. This does not mean that we cannot think about the sense of doing something. It is very important that students are aware of the paradoxes of sense and senselessness and operate with them. A thought that is contaminated with sense from the start can only produce sterility, ineffectiveness and dogma. Sense is uncompromised only when it comes close to a problem. A problem is closer to unformalized sensation than the linear process of “rational” thought. Summing it up very briefly we could say: sense = a problem. The questioning, deliberating, fantasizing triggered by a problem is what establishes the possibility of some inner logic, and thus, the sense of a solution.

A thing that really matters to a person is what has sense for them. It is the subject’s encounter with a difficulty, a disruption, an irritation that causes a problem. Or: the reality of a problem is not restricted to familiar empirical knowledge but is closer to some ignorance, to not-knowing; this not is only a negation to the extent that the solution is as yet unknown. It is operative in being the starting force: “it’s necessary to start”, or “something bothers me”, or “I want to do something differently”. The affirmation that replaces the not then becomes the driving force of thought and related practice. Affirmation is thus some kind of premonition… a premonition of a solution? Premonition speaks of the fact that the operation “problem–idea” is unconscious, outside empirical knowledge, outside conscious thought, and non-representational. And only as such it enables a student to work independently as an artist, which is, after all, our goal at our institution.



5

Why the need to repeat? Panel discussion at the opening of the exhibition The Present and Presence – Repetition 2, October 2012

We repeat to memorize, to remember, or to do something again or over. Maybe to pass an exam or finish school. In this sense, repetition relates to school and learning. We can repeat something once, twice, or over and over again. Repetition is often indicated with numbers – thus there is the 1st U3, the 2nd U3, etc. Sometimes numerals only extend so far; the second U3 is not only the 2nd U3, but to a much greater extent Weibel’s U3, where as the curator of the 2nd U3, Peter Weibel stirred up the Slovenian art scene with his selection and conceptual framework. Judging from the reactions, something similar happened again this year at the Museum of Architecture and Design’s biennial BIO 23 – “Weibel happened to designers”, as my colleague Žiga Kariž put it. Anyway, both these cases show that there are repetitions and then there are repetitions. There are repetitions that have, in addition to an ordinal numeral, also a name to distinguish them from their predecessors. Such repetitions are not meant to make us remember, but rather to push their predecessors into oblivion. What is at focus is the idea of a different view, which in the form of difference affirms reconsiderations of a given theme.
Affirmation is related to sense, although it is born in the realm of uncertainty, apparent impossibility or ignorance. A child learning to walk does not repeat falling in order to learn to fall better; the child repeats falls in order to eventually learn to walk. This is what I find essential about repetition. This is how I see Ader’s falls,6 which he repeated until, in his last project, he fell for the last time, figuratively speaking, or learned to walk, although he lost his life in the process. But that was the point of his repetitions. To repeat not because of falling; repeating the falling is just a step toward something else. Repetition is thus not something new for the sake of novelty, but a density of differences that affirms thought and, eventually, learning.
In learning, virtually everything counts and everything can appear in an endless number of possible constellations. Everything counts, but not in the sense of counting that interests bankers, economists, the administration; everything counts in terms of precision. Every little detail, no matter how small, can change the context and the content of the entire constellation when appearing in a new place. And if everything counts, the need to be extremely precise is all the more binding.
On the other hand, “everything counts” does not mean that this refers to accumulating empirical knowledge or dogmas taught at school. Far from that, “everything counts” includes the whole range of diversity of sensation. Let’s recall the process of a child learning to walk. The entire body is involved in this, the whole scope of feeling and thinking. One must use all of one’s imagination in order to learn, and this I understand as the effort invested in arriving at a thought, in arriving at something that matters to us and that makes sense to us because of that. At the same time this “at” in the phrase “arrive at thought” refers to the space before thought, not non-thought, but the fullness, the intensity of feeling, the excitement that will lead us to the point where we are forced into thinking.
However, thinking does not come easily, naturally; there is nothing natural about thinking. Thinking is closer to an intrusion than honest hard work. It is the fruit of the encounter between necessity and thought. To think does not mean “I think” but rather “something is forcing me to think”, or more precisely, “the thought itself is forcing me to think” – it is stuck in my mind; I am probably or certainly thinking even when it seems I am not thinking. We see evidence of this in the solutions that come to us in a flash, appearing out of nowhere, as if the thought had resolved itself without any conscious or rational effort on our part – and it probably has.
A prerequisite for thinking to start is an intense encounter manifested by the perception of something – our noticing something. Encountering, as sentient beings, something outside us triggers thinking or makes us think. In short: from sentient to self; but it is not “I” who thinks, it is this operation “from–to” which triggers the process in us. A thought is an intrusion, an invasion of something in us; we do not start thinking, it is this density, this intensity of what we feel that excites us, forcing us to formulate a problem, and thought is triggered in us.
At the same time we need to be aware that the sense of an operation only originates in an environment free of sense and thus suspended in the indefiniteness of senselessness. Sense is an idea; here, thought is not reduced to sense, sense originates and is structured only inside the process of thinking. Senselessness is thus a building block of sense and the purpose of thought. This is the core problem of the politics now in power: it desperately wants a university that would produce knowledge directly applicable in industry and business. Art, as well as most humanities, is acutely aware of the conditions determining sense: they only originate in an environment free of sense and thus floating in the indefiniteness of senselessness. I like to use the metaphor of a wild meadow: we water it without knowing where and what will bloom and show up different from the rest. The point of sense is not some predetermined purpose; university should be free of seeking immediate effectiveness. Sense only appears when a problem has been resolved. And a problem is a premonition of something, a certain particularity, disjointedness that creates the possibility of some inner logic and sense of a solution only in the processes of solving a problem.
The operativeness of such activities (including art) is thus not on the side of direct effect, like it is for politics; it is operativeness in this indeterminateness that enables daydreaming or fantasizing. Fantasizing sums up the difference between the operation of thought and the emptiness of thought or nothing that is part of artistic activity. Art work constructs an empty space that makes fantasizing possible, which is not an operative thought but tries to provide meanings ranging from a not-quite-determined space of nothing, minor flashes of fantasy, daydreaming, and, eventually, thought that has the capacity to become operative and thus operate in the world. Here, the operativeness of thought is something different than the operativeness of art. The latter is on the side of constructing empty space; removing templates, educational patterns and quotes allows something to flow into the empty space. The content of the flow cannot be controlled; it is a matter of thought. Let me repeat: the thing of art, or rather, the operation of art is nothing; if you will, art is nothingness. This nothingness, which also implies worthlessness, is the reverse side of good art, of work that functions, in its process and in its structure, as a logical machine (it must be thus). On the other hand, the idea of nothingness (in the sense of worthlessness) relates to an object that is unrecognized, non-designed, formally open, and ontologically uncertain, which makes fantasizing possible.
In the final analysis, such reflections cover both sides of this unusual definition of an artwork, following, on the one hand, its inner logic, and on the other containing an element of formal or some other uncertainty that enables the still-openness of the work and pertains to the field of an idea that is still alive and operative. The sense of repetition can thus be found in the field of action – or in the field of the still-openness, vitality and operativeness of an idea.

1 At the end of each term, professors at the academy make a round of the studios pertaining to individual years.
2 The Academy of Fine Arts and Design in Ljubljana.
3 Notes taken at a lecture delivered by philosopher Rado Riha at the Research Center of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts in the academic year 2009/10.
4 I am referring to the developments, movements and practices that occurred in the time of modernism, but did not belong to the practices of painting or sculpture in the way described by the theoretician of modernism, C. Greenberg and his followers.
5 Gilles Deleuze, Razlika in ponavljanje[Difference and Repetition] (Ljubljana: Filozofski inštitut, 2011) 230.
6 Bas Jan Ader (1942 – 1975), Dutch artist; much of his practice involved fallings.

Translated by Tamara Soban

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