GOVORI, PAMFLETI (KOMENTARJI, refleksije …)

GOVORI, PAMFLETI (KOMENTARJI, refleksije …)

Jože Barši

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Govor na obhodu¹ ALUO²: letni semester, maj 2010

Močno dvomim o možnosti večjih sprememb na nivoju institucije. Institucijo vidim kot bolj ali manj slab okvir za konkretna dejanja posameznikov. In ta so odgovornost ali študentov ali pedagogov. Navsezadnje prav ti, poleg administrativnih in drugih nepedagoških delavcev, sestavljajo akademijo. Zato se mi zdijo izjemno pomembne vse te na prvi pogled majhne drugačnosti – drugosti, ki se dogajajo v okviru formaliziranih postopkov ali tudi zunaj njih.

Kar se mi zdi še posebno pomembno, je »povezovanje« teh drugosti. Čeprav gre na začetku za pomoč podobnosti, pa gre v naslednjih fazah za soobstoj konfliktnosti, ki tudi v nezdruževalni funkciji povzročajo ponovne razmisleke. Poudarjam: ne gre in naj ne bi šlo za zavzemanje prostora z enim načinom, eno formalizacijo, eno vizualizacijo. Navsezadnje se vedno znova izkaže, da sobivanje drugosti drugost omogoča. Ali drugače, pomembno je, da zavzamemo militantno držo do svojih prepričanj, obenem pa ne izgubimo iz vida dejstva, da smo varni takrat, ko premišljujemo o varnosti tistega, ki nam stoji nasproti, in se zavzemamo zanjo. To nikakor ne pomeni relativizacije ali, kot sem rekel, zavzemanja z enim načinom. Daleč od tega – pomeni predvsem še močnejšo konceptualizacijo raznolikih teritorijev.

Kaj je to, kar imenujem militantnost misli, oziroma, za kaj se zavzemam? Za soobstoj misli, seveda. Soobstoj ob čem? Gre za to, da je misel snovna, materialna, kot kateri koli material, ki se pojavlja v okviru naše institucije. Lahko bi rekli: ideja ni koncept, temveč je operacija, je dejanje, ki deluje v materialnem svetu, in kot táko je dejanje radikalne desublimacije – ne povzdigovanja, ne zamaknjenosti, temveč afirmacije. Ali, če sem natančnejši, gre za praznost/nič/nesmisel/problem, ki v nadaljevanju afirmira možnost emancipacije.

Če povzamem besede Rada Rihe: »Ideja je objekt posebnega kova in kot taka je nedizajnirana, je znamenje objektove narejenosti in njegove ontološke negotovosti, ki je znamenje še-odprtosti.

Ne gre za Kantovo idejo, ki spreminja svet na način relacije teorija – praksa oziroma kontemplacija – delovanje. Daleč od tega. Gre za to, da je misel objekt med objekti, da ni teorija, ki posledično deluje na prakso, temveč deli usodo vseh drugih objektov tega sveta.

Pravo vprašanje torej ni, 'kaj je ideja?', temveč 'kaj ideja dela v svetu?'. Misli namreč 'gre za nekaj'. Seveda ne gre za prisilo uresničitve, kajti bojte se uresničitve svojih želja, temveč je pomembno to, da misel vzpostavi distanco do sebe. Da sicer nekaj hoče ali da ji 'za nekaj gre', vendar temu 'hočem' doda še en miselni akt. Je neka stvar, ki daje misliti, je izvor misli, misli o nečem, in kot taka misli neodvisno od izvora, misli samo misel. Je predpostavka čiste misli, ki z delovanjem proizvaja svojo materialnost, in kot taka deluje v realnem svetu in kot delujoča proizvaja motnjo, ki ni nekaj evolucijskega.«³ Primer te stvari ali, če hočete, dobrega dela, delujočega v svetu, je ravno to, da nam daje oziroma nas sili misliti.

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Govor na obhodu ALUO: zimski semester, januar 2011

Če sem lansko leto govoril o misli, ki z delovanjem proizvaja svojo snovnost, je bil letošnji semester posvečen problemu reprezentacije te misli. Ali drugače, razprava se je vrtela okoli relacije formalno – neformalno. Izhodišče so bili teksti Charlesa Harrisona.

Vračanje kiparstva k tradicionalnemu modelu je stvar nevednosti in ekonomije. Zaskrbljujoče je, da praksa – in to katera koli umetniška praksa – nima moči, da bi se uprla krojenju svoje usode s strani katerega koli, še tako majhnega naročnika. Če bi imela umetnost resnično moč, družbeno in ekonomsko, ne bi niti pomislili na vračanje k tradicionalnemu modelu. Očitna regresija, recimo, splošno sprejetega javnega kiparstva v Sloveniji verjetno sploh ne bi bila možna v tej obliki. Seveda pa je težava – ali del nje – naš molk. To je tudi predmet razprav v letniku o tem, kako se pozablja na historično pridobljene in očitno znova izgubljene smeri modernizma,⁴ ki so vsaj po mojem mnenju temelj sodobnih umetniških praks. Seveda tu ne mislim na zgodnji ali visoki modernizem, temveč na boje, ki so jih bojevali Greenbergovi in Friedovi nasprotniki v minimalističnih in postminimalističnih praksah. Obdelovali smo lekcije poznih šestdesetih let in poskušali izostriti antiformalistične drže tistega časa v povezavi s tem, kar se dogaja danes. Seveda ne gre za to, da nekritično sprejemamo in poveličujemo ali kako drugače mistificiramo prakse, ki so se pojavljale ob visokem modernizmu, temveč za to, da jih reflektiramo, komentiramo in kritiziramo. Gre za raziskave, kritike in razprave, ki naj bi stimulirale razmisleke na temo sodobnih umetniških praks.

Ne gre niti za avtonomijo ali fetišizacijo umetnosti, ki v trenutku svoje zamrznitve v blago postane dogmatska in dekadentna. Avtonomija v umetniški praksi mora biti vedno in kadar koli relativna, kar omogoča oziroma pomeni biti odprt do kritike, »realizma« okolja in sprememb, ki jih nove situacije ustvarjajo. Še več, relativnost avtonomije je treba nenehno pregledovati in jo postavljati v kontekst sveta, v katerem se razmere spreminjajo, se pravi v zgodovini, ki jo živimo in ustvarjamo. Če bi namreč dopustili fiksiranje avtonomije umetnosti, bi to pomenilo, da sprejemamo predpise, protokole, kakšne naj bi bile umetniške prakse. Temu se na šoli, kot je naša, seveda ne moremo povsem odpovedati, vendar pa poudarjam to hrbtno stran umetnosti, ki govori o tistem, kar (še) ni umetnost/del stroke oziroma del tega, kar eksperti/poznavalci prepoznavajo kot umetnostna dela.

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Govor na otvoritvi razstave Utopični seminar v Muzeju za arhitekturo in oblikovanje: letni semester, junij 2011

Čeprav naj bi bil otvoritveni govor neke razstave karseda kratek in posvečen delom in zahvalam vsem sodelujočim, bom sam izkoristil to priložnost, da nekaj povem. Ta »povem« se seveda veže na celoletno delo in razmisleke, ki smo si jih med seboj bolj ali manj uspešno delili pedagogi in študentje.

Ne bom govoril o posameznih delih, navsezadnje so to še vedno študentska dela, narejena v času in prostoru Akademije za likovno umetnost in oblikovanje. Kar se mi zdi pomembno, je, da povem, kako je celoletni projekt potekal in kaj je sprožal. Kako je učinkoval in kot učinkujoč deloval na akterje skupnosti, ali bolje, na akterje kolektiva Utopistov. V primerjavi s historičnimi utopijami naš projekt ni bil rezultat misli enega človeka in njegovega nezadovoljstva z obstoječo družbo. Poizkus, ki smo se ga lotili, je bil zahteven, predvsem zato, ker je bilo vanj vpletenih toliko ljudi, študentov in profesorjev. Postopki, protokoli, metode in prakse poučevanja so se spremenili do mere, do katere smo sprejeli idejo o enakosti inteligenc, kar ne pomeni nič drugega kot to, da ne vstopamo v znane relacije pozicij vednosti, temveč računamo na to, da smo si v sposobnostih učenja enaki in da v proces ne vstopamo kot prazen list papirja, temveč s seboj nosimo ves repertoar predhodnih znanj, védenj ali mnenj.

Če je skupnost združba različnih, ki se jim priznava enakost, pa kolektiv zahteva usmerjenost, ki omogoča učinkovito delovanje, denimo, podjetja. Paradoks, ki se zastavlja pri tem odnosu, je viden že v samih definicijah. Skupnost kot združba posameznikov in kolektiv kot podjetje usmerjenosti, ki omogoča učinkovitost. Ta odnos je treba videti ne samo kot odnose med posameznimi subjekti, temveč tudi kot odnose med posameznimi strokami. Pri projektu so sodelovali študentje vizualnih komunikacij, industrijski oblikovalci, študentje kiparstva in slikarstva ter profesorji teh strok. Kolektivi so se ustvarjali, se razgrajevali, razpadali, se razumeli ali ne razumeli in se ponovno sestavljali. Ne glede na vse drame ali pasivnosti v vsem tem dogajanju pa se mi zdi to mešanje, premeščanje in tudi opuščanje ključno. Ta napor biti skupaj, čeprav z različnih strokovnih, osebnostnih ali mnenjskih pozicij, je ključen. Biti del skupnosti – če sprejemaš pravila igre, seveda – je načeloma lahko. Težava nastane, ko naj bi skupnost delovala kot kolektiv, ki si za nekaj skupaj prizadeva. Tu je igra mnogo bolj zapletena. Militantnost posamičnosti, njene misli ali ideje je treba sicer zagovarjati, a vendar paziti na dostojanstvo druge misli, kar vsekakor potegne za seboj idejo defetišizacije lastne stroke, ki nikakor ni omalovaževanje posameznih strokovnih stališč. Prav tako ne gre za konsenz o tem, kaj je oblikovanje ali umetnost, za konsenz o pravilnem formaliziranju vsebin. Ustvarjalni kolektiv ni konsenzualen, temveč je prostor, ki zagotavlja in omogoča konstruktivne spore, razlike in zamike med praksami. Gre za soobstoj konfliktnosti, ki ne pomeni relativizacije vsega, ampak se posamezna stališča prav z nestrinjanjem reaktivirajo, mobilizirajo, reaktualizirajo in na novo premislijo. To ne pomeni nič drugega kot to, da med posameznimi praksami ni pomiritve, ni zaključka, temveč gre za dinamično razmerje, ki vedno na novo rekonfigurira izkušnjo čutnega. Obenem pa defetišizacija posameznih praks omogoča prav te nove formalne svobode.

Postopki formaliziranja niso zapovedani, so pa v procesu operacionalnosti še delujoče ideje odprti; v tem se razlikujejo od, recimo, zamrznjenih konceptov ali znanih definicij. In tu se mi zdi kolektiv tako pomemben, pa čeprav je to kolektiv samo ene šole, ene institucije, ene naloge ali celo minimalno samo dveh oseb. Šola ali učenje tako ni samo akumulacija empiričnih vednosti v samoti knjige in učenca, daleč od tega: učenje je mešanje teles, ki omogoči srečanja in posledično tudi spore, konflikte, ki se v nadaljevanju lahko izkažejo kot ključni pri demontaži starih in montaži novih pogledov na kar koli že. Šola je tako prostor možnosti interakcije med učiteljem in študenti, med učiteljem in študentom, ali med študenti samimi. Slednje je v okolju umetniških šol nadvse pomembno. Opazovati, kaj delajo drugi, to primerjati s svojim delom ali se konfrontirati z okolico v obliki komentarjev, vprašanj, dvomov ali zagovorov. Sprejeti tovrstna srečanja in biti dojemljiv zanje. Deleuze temu pravi: misliti je srečanje in to srečanje nas sili misliti.⁵ Srečanje je namreč vedno srečanje z nečim, česar ne prepoznamo, kar v nas budi zanimanje – radovednost, ki je sicer lastnost mnogih živali in otrok, pogosto potem zatrta v postopkih dogmatske misli, ki jih zahtevajo institucije.

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Govor na obhodu ALUO: zimski semester, Afirmacija in smisel, junij 2012

Kot sem v preteklosti že mnogokrat rekel, je prehod od nalog, ki ji zada profesor ali so določene s programom, k samostojnejšemu delu, ki naj bi kulminiralo v diplomi, za študente izjemno težak. V letošnjem študijskem letu sem ubral drugačno pot kot prejšnja leta. Veliko manj sem se neposredno ukvarjal s konkretnimi deli študentov in sem učil nekako od strani. V ospredju sta bila dva pojma: afirmacija in smisel. O njiju sem razglabljal na petkovih predavanjih, ki sem jih izvajal ves semester.

Začeti z nečim, kar bo v prihodnosti lastna umetniška praksa, tako pomeni tudi začeti »misliti s svojo glavo«. Učenje v tem primeru tako ni samo empirični posrednik med nevednostjo in vednostjo, temveč mnogo več. V postopke učenja je vpleteno celotno telo z vsem repertoarjem čutnosti in mišljenja. Lahko bi rekli, da vednost ni nabiranje dogmatskih načel vednosti, ampak je učenje mišljenje onkraj mišljenja; pri tem »onkraj« pomeni prostor onkraj empirije, onkraj znane in zapovedane reprezentacije.

Vendar »onkraj« ni prepuščen neki otroški domišljiji. Domišljijo razumem mnogo bolj kot napor, kako priti do misli, priti do nečesa, za kar nam gre in ima zato za nas neki smisel. Seveda se je treba zavedati pogojev določitve smisla, ki nastaja šele v okolju, ki je razbremenjeno smisla, in tako plava v nedoločenosti nesmisla. Smisel je tako dogodek, ki se zgodi ali pa ne, ni fiksen, je nekakšna razsežnost. To nikakor ne pomeni, da se s smislom nekega početja ne moremo ukvarjati. Zelo pomembno je, da se študent zaveda paradoksov smisla in nesmisla in z njimi tudi operira. Misel, ki je v svoji začetni poziciji kontaminirana s smislom, sproducira le sterilnost, neučinkovitost in dogmatsko misel. Smisel je namreč nekompromitiran takrat, ko je v neposredni bližini nekega problema. Problem je bliže neformalizirani čutnosti kot pa linearnemu postopku »racionalnega« mišljenja. Zelo skrajšano bi lahko rekli: smisel = problem. Spraševanje, tuhtanje, maštanje, ki jih povzroči problem, so neke partikularnosti, ki šele v postopkih reševanja problema vzpostavljajo možnost notranje logike in tako smisla neke rešitve.

Smiselno je to, za kar pri nekomu zares gre. Je srečanje subjekta z neko težavo, motnjo, jezo, ki povzroči problem. Ali drugače, resničnost problema ni vezana na znano empirijo, temveč je prej blizu neki ne-vednosti, ki je negacija le do te mere, da še ne poznamo rešitve. Operativnost ne-ja se namreč kaže le v začetku, v: »treba je začeti«, ali »mene nekaj moti«, ali »jaz hočem drugače«. Afirmacija, ki izrine ne, je namreč v nadaljevanju tisti motor, ki žene mišljenje in z njim povezano prakso. Afirmacija je tako nekakšna slutnja … slutnja rešitve? Slutnja pa govori o tem, da je operacija »problem – ideja« po naravi nezavedna, zunaj empiričnega, zunaj zavestno mišljenega in nereprezentativna. In le kot taka omogoča, da študent postane samostojno delujoči umetnik, kar je na instituciji, kot je naša, navsezadnje tudi naš cilj.

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Zakaj moramo ponavljati? Okrogla miza ob odprtju razstave Sedanjost in prisotnost – ponovitev 2, oktober 2012

Ponavljamo, da bi si zapomnili, se spomnili, pozabili ali nekaj ponovno ali na novo naredili. Da bi naredili, recimo, izpit ali šolo. Ponavljanje je tako povezano s šolo in učenjem. Ponavljamo lahko enkrat, dvakrat ali celo večkrat. Kar pomeni, da je ponavljanje povezano s števili. Tako imamo prvi U3, drugi U3 in tako dalje. Vendar se števniki včasih na nekem mestu ustavijo; tako, recimo, drugi U3 ni samo drugi U3, temveč je veliko bolj Weiblov U3, ker je bil kustos drugega U3-ja Peter Weibel, ki je s svojim izborom in konceptualnim okvirom močno razburkal slovensko strokovno javnost. Glede na odzive se je nekaj podobnega zgodilo tudi na letošnjem BIU 23 – »oblikovalcem se je zgodil Weibel«, kot je pripomnil kolega Žiga Kariž. Kakor koli že, oba dogodka pričata o tem, da so ponavljanja in so ponavljanja. So ponovitve, ki imajo poleg števnega tudi svoje osebno ime in kot take pričajo o razliki od svojih predhodnikov. Ponovitve niso zato, da bi se spomnili, mnogo bolj so namenjene pozabi predhodnikov. V ospredju je ideja o drugačnem pogledu, ki v obliki razlike afirmira ponovne razmisleke o določeni temi.

Afirmacija je povezana s smislom, čeprav se rojeva v polju negotovosti, nezmožnosti ali nevednosti. Otrok, ki poskuša shoditi, ne ponavlja padcev zato, da bi bolje padal; padce ponavlja zato, da bi shodil. To se mi zdi ključno pri ponavljanju. Tako navsezadnje razumem tudi Aderjeve⁶ padce, ki jih je ponavljal, dokler ni pri svojem zadnjem projektu dokončno padel, seveda v prenesenem smislu, ali shodil, čeprav je pri projektu izgubil življenje. Ampak to je poanta njegovih ponavljanj. Ponavljati ne zaradi padanja; ponavljanje padanja je samo korak na poti do nečesa drugega. Ponovitev tako ni novost zaradi novosti, temveč gostota razlike, ki afirmira mišljenje in v nadaljevanju učenje.

Pri učenju tako rekoč vse šteje in vse se lahko pojavi v nešteto možnih konstelacijah. Vse šteje ne v smislu preštevanja – preštevanje zanima bankirje, ekonomiste ali administracijo; vse šteje v smislu natančnosti. Vsak, še tako majhen detajl lahko na novem mestu spremeni kontekst in vsebino celotne konstelacije. Če vse šteje, je zahteva po izjemni natančnosti toliko bolj obvezujoča.

»Vse šteje« pa po drugi strani pomeni tudi to, da ne gre za nabiranje empirije in dogem, ki se jih učimo v šoli. Daleč od tega, »vse šteje« vključuje tudi vso raznolikost čutnosti. Spomnimo se učenja hoje pri otroku. Vpleteno je vse telo s celotnim repertoarjem čutenja in mišljenja. Da bi se naučili, je treba uporabiti vso domišljijo, to pa razumem bolj kot napor, kako dospeti do misli, kako priti do nečesa, za kar si prizadevamo in ima kot tako za nas neki smisel. Obenem pa ta »do« v besedni zvezi »do misli« pomeni prostor, ki je še pred mislijo, ne nemisel, temveč polnost, intenzivnost čutenja, vznemirjenje, ki nas bo pripeljalo do tega, da bomo prisiljeni misliti.

Vendar se mišljenje ne zgodi z lahkoto, z neko naravnostjo, nič naravnega ni v mišljenju. Misliti je bliže vdoru kot pa dobremu in pridnemu delu. Je plod nekega srečanja nujnosti in mišljenja. Misliti namreč ne pomeni »jaz mislim«, temveč mnogo bolj »nekaj me sili misliti«, ali še natančneje, »misel sama me sili misliti« – ne gre mi iz glave, verjetno ali prav gotovo mislim tudi takrat, ko se mi zdi, da ne mislim. Navsezadnje nam to dokazujejo tudi nenadni prebliski rešitev, ki se pojavijo kar iz nič, kot da – in verjetno je tako – bi se razmislilo samo v sebi, ne da bi na to zavestno in racionalno vplivali.

Pogoj sprožitve mišljenja je intenzivnost srečanja, ki ga predstavlja zaznava nečesa – to, da nekaj opazimo. To, da se kot zaznavajoča oseba srečamo z nečim, kar je sicer zunaj nas, povzroči mišljenje ali nas sili k mišljenju. Na kratko: od čutnega k jazu; vendar jaz ne misli, temveč je operacija »od – k« tista, ki povzroči, da nekaj v nas začne delovati. Misel je vdor nečesa v nas; mi ne začnemo misliti, temveč nas ta gostota, intenzivnost občutenega vznemiri in prisili, da zastavimo problem, in v nas se sproži mišljenje.

Obenem se je treba zavedati, da nastaja smisel neke operacije šele v okolju, ki je razbremenjeno smisla in tako plava v nedoločenosti nesmisla. Smisel je ideja; pri tem se misel ne zvede na smisel, temveč se smisel poraja in strukturira šele v notranjosti postopka mišljenja. Nesmiselnost je tako gradnik smisla in smotrnosti misli. Tu je tudi srž problema trenutne politične oblasti: na vse pretege si želi univerzo, ki bi proizvajala znanja, neposredno uporabna v gospodarstvu. Umetnost, in navsezadnje tudi večina humanističnih znanosti, se močno zaveda pogojev določitve smisla, ki nastajajo šele v okolju, ki je razbremenjeno smisla in tako plava v nedoločenosti nesmisla. Sam uporabljam metaforo divjega travnika, ki ga je treba zalivati, ne da bi natančno vedeli, kje in kaj bo vzcvetelo in se pokazalo v razliki do drugega rastlinja. Poanta smisla ni v predhodnem smotru, temveč naj bi bila univerza razbremenjena iskanj v smislu neposredne učinkovitosti. Smisel se namreč pojavi šele potem, ko razrešimo problem. Problem je slutnja nečesa, neka partikularnost, razkosanost, ki šele v postopkih reševanja problema vzpostavlja možnost notranje logike in smisla neke rešitve.

Operativnost tovrstnega delovanja, h kateremu prištevam tudi umetnost, tako ni na strani neposrednega učinkovanja kot v primeru pamfletnosti politike, temveč je njena operativnost prav v tej nedoločenosti, ki omogoča maštanje. Hrvaška beseda maštanje namreč lepo opiše razliko med operacijo misli in praznostjo misli ali ničem, ki je del umetnostnega delovanja. Umetnostno delo gradi neki prazen prostor, ki omogoči maštanje, ki ni operativna misel, temveč poskuša dati pomene v razponu od ne povsem določenega prostora niča, drobnih prebliskov, sanjarjenj in na koncu do misli, ki ima možnost postati operativna in tako delujoča misel v svetu. Operativnost misli je tu drugo kot operativnost umetnosti. Slednja je na strani ustvarjanja praznega prostora; odstranitev šablon, didaktičnosti in citiranja omogoči, da v prazen prostor nekaj steče. Vsebine tega pretoka seveda ni mogoče kontrolirati, to je stvar misli. Naj ponovim, stvar umetnosti ali bolje operacija umetnosti je nič ali če želite umetnost je za-nič. Besedna igra za-nič, ki ustvari »zaničnost«, je hrbtna stran dobrega umetnostnega dela, ki v svojem postopku, v svoji strukturi, deluje kot logični stroj (tako mora biti). Po drugi strani pa se ideja zaničnosti veže na objekt, ki je neprepoznan, nedizajniran, formalno odprt in ontološko negotov, kar omogoča, da se maštanje sproži.

Na koncu tovrstni razmisleki pokrijejo obe strani te nenavadne definicije za umetnostno delo, ki po eni strani sledi svoji notranji logiki, po drugi strani pa vsebuje element formalne ali kakšne druge negotovosti, ki omogoča še odprtost samega dela in kot taka pripada polju še žive in delujoče ideje. Smisel ponovitve je tako mogoče umestiti v polje delovanja – oziroma še odprtosti in živosti, delujočnosti neke ideje.

1 Obhod profesorjev po letnikih/ateljejih akademije ob koncu semestra.

2 Akademija za likovno umetnost in oblikovanje v Ljubljani.

3 Zapiski s predavanj filozofa R. Rihe na ZRC SAZU v študijskem letu 2009/10.

4 Tu mislim predvsem na pojave, gibanja in prakse, ki so se sicer pojavile ali pojavljale v času modernizma, a niso pripadale praksam slikarstva ali kiparstva na način, kot so jih utemeljevali teoretik modernizma C. Greenberg in njegovi učenci.

5 Gilles Deleuze, Razlika in ponavljanje, Filozofski inštitut, Ljubljana, 2011, str. 230.

6 Bas Jan Ader (1942 – 1975), nizozemski umetnik; velik del njegove prakse so bili padci.

TALKS, PAMPHLETS (COMMENTARIES, REFLECTIONS…)

TALKS, PAMPHLETS (COMMENTARIES, REFLECTIONS…)

Jože Barši

1

Talk on the rounds¹ of the Academy²: spring semester, May 2010

I seriously doubt the possibility of any major changes occurring at the level of the institution. I see the institution as a more or less unfavorable framework for the concrete actions of individuals. And such actions are the responsibility of either the students or the teachers. After all, they are the people that, apart from the administration and other non-faculty staff, constitute the academy. This is why I find all the seemingly minor differences so important – the otherness that occurs within formalized procedures as well as outside them.

A thing that seems particularly important is “connecting” these differences. In the beginning, there is similarity, which is helpful; in the stages that follow, however, there is the coexistence of conflicting positions which, in their non-unifying function, lead to rethinking. Let me stress: the idea is not, and should never be, to impose one approach, one formalization, one visualization. In the end it always turns out that the coexistence of differences makes otherness possible. Or in other words: it is important to take a militant stand on one’s beliefs without losing sight of the fact that we are safe only when thinking about and standing up for the safety of the one taking the opposite position. This does not mean relativizing everything or, as I said, imposing a single approach. Far from it – it means, above all, an even stronger conceptualization of diverse territories.

What is the thing I call militancy of thought, what is it that I am after? The coexistence of thought, of course. Coexistence with what? The point here is that thought is material, as material as any other material encountered at our institution. We could say: an idea is not a concept but an operation, an act that works in the material world, and as such, an act of radical desublimation – not of exaltation, not of transfixion, but of affirmation. Or more precisely, it is the emptiness/nothing/nonsense/ problem that subsequently affirms the possibility of emancipation.

To sum up the words of Rado Riha: “An idea is an object of a special kind, and as such non-designed, it is a token of the object’s artificiality and its ontological insecurity, which is a mark of still-openness.

“This is not about Kant’s idea of transforming the world in the manner of the relation theory—practice or contemplation—operation. Far from it. It is about thought being an object among other objects, not theory that affects practice as a consequence, but an object sharing the fate of all other objects in the world.

“The question is thus not ‘What is an idea?’ but ‘What does an idea do in the world?’. Thought is ‘after something’. Of course, it’s not after forceful realization – beware of your wishes coming true; what is important is that thought establishes a distance to itself. That it wants something, that it ‘is after’ something, but that it adds another thought act to this ‘wanting’. There is a thing that makes one think, there is a source of thought, of thought about something, and as such the thought is independent of its source, it thinks the thought itself. It is a presupposition of pure thought which in operation produces its materiality, and as such works in the real world, and in its working produces the interference that is not evolutionary.”³ An example of this thing, or if you will, of good work functioning in the world, is that it makes or forces us to think.

2

Talk on the rounds of the Academy: fall semester, January 2011

Last year I spoke about the thought that, in the act of thinking, produces its materiality; this semester was dedicated to the problem of the representation of this thought. To put it differently: the discussions were about the relation formal—informal. Our point of departure was Charles Harrison’s texts.

Sculpture retrograding to the traditional model is a matter of ignorance and economy. A thing that causes concern is that practice – any artistic practice – does not have the power to resist having its fate dictated by sponsors, no matter how insignificant. If art possessed real social and economic power, we wouldn’t even think about reverting to traditional models. The obvious regression of, say, public sculpture in Slovenia would not, in all likelihood, even be possible in this form. Of course, the problem – or part of the problem – is our saying nothing. This is also the topic of our discussions this year: how historically achieved developments in modernism have again, obviously, been lost⁴, forgotten; developments that, in my view at least, form the basis of contemporary art practices. Of course, I am not referring to early or high modernism, but to the efforts that those who opposed Greenberg and Fried invested in minimalist and post-minimalist practices. We covered the lessons dealing with the late 1960s, trying to bring the antiformalist approaches of the time into relation with present-day developments. Of course, the point is not to uncritically accept or glorify or mystify practices concurrent with high modernism, but to reflect on them, comment on them, critically address them. To research, review, and discuss them with the aim of stimulating reflection on contemporary artistic practices.

The point is also not the autonomy of art or fetishizing it; as soon as art turns into a commodity, it becomes dogmatic and decadent. Autonomy in artistic practices must always be relative; that is, open to criticism, to the “reality” of its environment, and to the changes that new circumstances bring. Furthermore, the relativeness of this autonomy must be checked and rechecked, put into the context of a world of changing circumstances, that is to say, the history we live and create. Because, if we were to allow the autonomy of art to become fixed, that would entail also accepting some conventions and protocols of what artistic practices should be like. Now, obviously, this is something that cannot be completely avoided at a school like ours, but what I would like to stress is this reverse side of art, which speaks of that which is (as yet) not art, not part of the professional field or part of what experts/connoisseurs recognize as art(works).

3

Talk at the opening of the Utopian Seminar exhibition at the Museum of Architecture and Design: spring semester, June 2011

Speeches at exhibition openings are expected to be short, just a few words about the works and a thanks to all the people involved. Nevertheless, I’d like to take this opportunity and actually say something. My “say” will refer to a whole year’s worth of work and reflections that we – teachers and students – have fairly successfully shared.

I won’t talk about individual works; after all, these are still student works, done, in terms of time and space, at the Academy of Fine Arts and Design in Ljubljana. I find it important to talk about how the year-long project evolved and what it triggered. What effect it had, and how this in turn affected the agents of the community, or better, the agents of the Utopians collective. Unlike historical utopias, our project was not the result of the thoughts of one person and his or her dissatisfaction with the state of society. Our experiment was particularly demanding in that it involved a great number of people, students and faculty. The procedures, protocols, methods, and practices of teaching changed to the extent we accepted the idea of equality of intelligences. What this means is simply that we do not enter the familiar positions of knowing, but depart from the fact that we are equal in our capacities for learning and that we do not enter the process as a tabula rasa, but bring the whole range of our previous knowledge, learning, and opinions to it.

If a community is a group of different people recognized as equal, a collective must be goal-oriented to be efficient in its work; think, for instance, of a business venture. The paradox inherent in this relationship is apparent already in the definitions: a community as a group of individuals and a collective as a venture of orientation that enables efficiency. This relation must exist not only between individuals, but also between individual professional fields. Our project involved the participation of students of visual communication, industrial design, sculpture, painting, and their professors. Collectives came together, disintegrated, fell apart, got along, did not get along, and reassembled. Regardless of all the drama and the passivity involved, I find this mixing, transferring and also quitting crucial. This effort invested in being together, despite the different positions of departure in terms of profession, personality, and opinion, is crucial. Being part of a community is easy – as long as one abides by the rules of the game. The problem arises when a community must act as a collective working toward a common goal. This makes the game more complicated. The militancy of individuality, one’s thought or idea must be defended, but in a way that preserves the dignity of the thought of another, which necessarily entails defetishizing one’s own professional field and in no way disparaging any professional point of view. Our aim was not to arrive at a consensus on what art and design are, or a consensus about a correct formalization of contents. A creative collective is not consensual; it is a space that ensures and enables constructive disagreements, differences, and divergences between practices. It is a coexistence of conflicting positions, which does not entail relativizing everything; on the contrary, through disagreement individual positions are reactivated, mobilized, made topical, and reconsidered. This means that individual practices are not reconciled, there is no conclusion, but a dynamic relation that reconfigures the sensuous experience over and over. At the same time defetishizing individual practices enables new formal freedom.

The procedures of formalizing are not stipulated, but open in the process of the operativeness of a (still) working idea; in this they differ from, for instance, fixed concepts or familiar definitions. This is where the collective is so important, even if it consists of only one school, one institution, one task group, or as few as just two people. Education or learning is not just accumulation of empirical knowledge in solitude, between a book and a student, far from that: learning is the mixing of bodies that enables encounters, and as a consequence, also discord, conflicts that can turn out to be essential for dismantling old views and introducing new ones. A school is a space of possible interactions between a teacher and students, a teacher and a single student, or students amongst themselves. The latter is particularly important in an art school. To observe what the others are doing, compare it with one’s own work, or confront those surrounding one with commentaries, questions, skepticism, or justifications; to embrace such encounters with an open mind. On this subject Deleuze offers that thinking is an encounter and it is this encounter that is making us think.⁵ An encounter is always an encounter with something unrecognizable that arouses interest – that curiosity innate to many animals and to children, though subsequently often suppressed in the dogmatic thought processes enforced by institutions.

4

Talk on the rounds of the ALUO: fall semester, Affirmation and Sense, January 2012

As I have often said in the past, making the transition from tasks assigned by a professor or the study program to more independent work that is to culminate in a diploma work is extremely difficult for students. This year I have decided to take a different approach. I have spent far less time dealing directly with specific student works and focused more on teaching from the sidelines as it were. Two notions took center stage: affirmation and sense. I spoke about them at Friday lectures throughout the semester.

Starting something that will eventually evolve into one’s artistic practice means starting to “think for oneself”. Learning in this case is not just empirical mediation between ignorance and knowledge, but much more than that. One’s entire body is involved in the learning processes, the whole scope of sensation and thinking. We could put it this way: knowledge is not accumulated dogmatic principles of knowing; rather, learning is thinking beyond thinking. Here “beyond” means the space beyond empirical knowledge, beyond the familiar and prescribed representation.

This “beyond” is not the realm of some childish imagination. I understand imagination in terms of the effort to arrive at thought, to arrive at something that matters to us and that for this reason makes sense to us. Of course, it is necessary to be aware of the conditions of defining sense that only originates in an environment free of sense and therefore floating in the indefiniteness of senselessness. Sense is an event that happens or does not happen; it is not fixed, but rather a dimension. This does not mean that we cannot think about the sense of doing something. It is very important that students are aware of the paradoxes of sense and senselessness and operate with them. A thought that is contaminated with sense from the start can only produce sterility, ineffectiveness and dogma. Sense is uncompromised only when it comes close to a problem. A problem is closer to unformalized sensation than the linear process of “rational” thought. Summing it up very briefly we could say: sense = a problem. The questioning, deliberating, fantasizing triggered by a problem is what establishes the possibility of some inner logic, and thus, the sense of a solution.

A thing that really matters to a person is what has sense for them. It is the subject’s encounter with a difficulty, a disruption, an irritation that causes a problem. Or: the reality of a problem is not restricted to familiar empirical knowledge but is closer to some ignorance, to not-knowing; this not is only a negation to the extent that the solution is as yet unknown. It is operative in being the starting force: “it’s necessary to start”, or “something bothers me”, or “I want to do something differently”. The affirmation that replaces the not then becomes the driving force of thought and related practice. Affirmation is thus some kind of premonition… a premonition of a solution? Premonition speaks of the fact that the operation “problem–idea” is unconscious, outside empirical knowledge, outside conscious thought, and non-representational. And only as such it enables a student to work independently as an artist, which is, after all, our goal at our institution.

5

Why the need to repeat? Panel discussion at the opening of the exhibition The Present and Presence – Repetition 2, October 2012

We repeat to memorize, to remember, or to do something again or over. Maybe to pass an exam or finish school. In this sense, repetition relates to school and learning. We can repeat something once, twice, or over and over again. Repetition is often indicated with numbers – thus there is the 1^st U3, the 2^nd U3, etc. Sometimes numerals only extend so far; the second U3 is not only the 2^nd U3, but to a much greater extent Weibel’s U3, where as the curator of the 2^nd U3, Peter Weibel stirred up the Slovenian art scene with his selection and conceptual framework. Judging from the reactions, something similar happened again this year at the Museum of Architecture and Design’s biennial BIO 23 – “Weibel happened to designers”, as my colleague Žiga Kariž put it. Anyway, both these cases show that there are repetitions and then there are repetitions. There are repetitions that have, in addition to an ordinal numeral, also a name to distinguish them from their predecessors. Such repetitions are not meant to make us remember, but rather to push their predecessors into oblivion. What is at focus is the idea of a different view, which in the form of difference affirms reconsiderations of a given theme.

Affirmation is related to sense, although it is born in the realm of uncertainty, apparent impossibility or ignorance. A child learning to walk does not repeat falling in order to learn to fall better; the child repeats falls in order to eventually learn to walk. This is what I find essential about repetition. This is how I see Ader’s falls,⁶ which he repeated until, in his last project, he fell for the last time, figuratively speaking, or learned to walk, although he lost his life in the process. But that was the point of his repetitions. To repeat not because of falling; repeating the falling is just a step toward something else. Repetition is thus not something new for the sake of novelty, but a density of differences that affirms thought and, eventually, learning.

In learning, virtually everything counts and everything can appear in an endless number of possible constellations. Everything counts, but not in the sense of counting that interests bankers, economists, the administration; everything counts in terms of precision. Every little detail, no matter how small, can change the context and the content of the entire constellation when appearing in a new place. And if everything counts, the need to be extremely precise is all the more binding.

On the other hand, “everything counts” does not mean that this refers to accumulating empirical knowledge or dogmas taught at school. Far from that, “everything counts” includes the whole range of diversity of sensation. Let’s recall the process of a child learning to walk. The entire body is involved in this, the whole scope of feeling and thinking. One must use all of one’s imagination in order to learn, and this I understand as the effort invested in arriving at a thought, in arriving at something that matters to us and that makes sense to us because of that. At the same time this “at” in the phrase “arrive at thought” refers to the space before thought, not non-thought, but the fullness, the intensity of feeling, the excitement that will lead us to the point where we are forced into thinking.

However, thinking does not come easily, naturally; there is nothing natural about thinking. Thinking is closer to an intrusion than honest hard work. It is the fruit of the encounter between necessity and thought. To think does not mean “I think” but rather “something is forcing me to think”, or more precisely, “the thought itself is forcing me to think” – it is stuck in my mind; I am probably or certainly thinking even when it seems I am not thinking. We see evidence of this in the solutions that come to us in a flash, appearing out of nowhere, as if the thought had resolved itself without any conscious or rational effort on our part – and it probably has.

A prerequisite for thinking to start is an intense encounter manifested by the perception of something – our noticing something. Encountering, as sentient beings, something outside us triggers thinking or makes us think. In short: from sentient to self; but it is not “I” who thinks, it is this operation “from–to” which triggers the process in us. A thought is an intrusion, an invasion of something in us; we do not start thinking, it is this density, this intensity of what we feel that excites us, forcing us to formulate a problem, and thought is triggered in us.

At the same time we need to be aware that the sense of an operation only originates in an environment free of sense and thus suspended in the indefiniteness of senselessness. Sense is an idea; here, thought is not reduced to sense, sense originates and is structured only inside the process of thinking. Senselessness is thus a building block of sense and the purpose of thought. This is the core problem of the politics now in power: it desperately wants a university that would produce knowledge directly applicable in industry and business. Art, as well as most humanities, is acutely aware of the conditions determining sense: they only originate in an environment free of sense and thus floating in the indefiniteness of senselessness. I like to use the metaphor of a wild meadow: we water it without knowing where and what will bloom and show up different from the rest. The point of sense is not some predetermined purpose; university should be free of seeking immediate effectiveness. Sense only appears when a problem has been resolved. And a problem is a premonition of something, a certain particularity, disjointedness that creates the possibility of some inner logic and sense of a solution only in the processes of solving a problem.

The operativeness of such activities (including art) is thus not on the side of direct effect, like it is for politics; it is operativeness in this indeterminateness that enables daydreaming or fantasizing. Fantasizing sums up the difference between the operation of thought and the emptiness of thought or nothing that is part of artistic activity. Art work constructs an empty space that makes fantasizing possible, which is not an operative thought but tries to provide meanings ranging from a not-quite-determined space of nothing, minor flashes of fantasy, daydreaming, and, eventually, thought that has the capacity to become operative and thus operate in the world. Here, the operativeness of thought is something different than the operativeness of art. The latter is on the side of constructing empty space; removing templates, educational patterns and quotes allows something to flow into the empty space. The content of the flow cannot be controlled; it is a matter of thought. Let me repeat: the thing of art, or rather, the operation of art is nothing; if you will, art is nothingness. This nothingness, which also implies worthlessness, is the reverse side of good art, of work that functions, in its process and in its structure, as a logical machine (it must be thus). On the other hand, the idea of nothingness (in the sense of worthlessness) relates to an object that is unrecognized, non-designed, formally open, and ontologically uncertain, which makes fantasizing possible.

In the final analysis, such reflections cover both sides of this unusual definition of an artwork, following, on the one hand, its inner logic, and on the other containing an element of formal or some other uncertainty that enables the still-openness of the work and pertains to the field of an idea that is still alive and operative. The sense of repetition can thus be found in the field of action – or in the field of the still-openness, vitality and operativeness of an idea.

1 At the end of each term, professors at the academy make a round of the studios pertaining to individual years.

2 The Academy of Fine Arts and Design in Ljubljana.

3 Notes taken at a lecture delivered by philosopher Rado Riha at the Research Center of the Slovenian Academy of Sciences and Arts in the academic year 2009/10.

4 I am referring to the developments, movements and practices that occurred in the time of modernism, but did not belong to the practices of painting or sculpture in the way described by the theoretician of modernism, C. Greenberg and his followers.

5 Gilles Deleuze, Razlika in ponavljanje[Difference and Repetition] (Ljubljana: Filozofski inštitut, 2011) 230.

6 Bas Jan Ader (1942 – 1975), Dutch artist; much of his practice involved fallings.

Translated by Tamara Soban